



C e n t r e  f o r  E u r o p e a n
E c o n o m i c  R e s e a r c h
Discussion Paper No. 01-60
A Mean Variance King? 
Creation and Resolution of Uncertainty
Under the Employment Report’s Reign
Nikolaus Hautsch and Dieter Hess

Non-Technical Summary
This paper analyzes the impact of unexpected information in the US employment
report on T-Bond futures. Information arrival can have two effects: On the one
hand, non-anticipated information in public news induces a shift in traders’ be-
liefs about the equilibrium price level. On the other hand, the implications of new
macroeconomic information may be interpreted differently across traders leading to
an increase in volatility. In contrast to the previous literature which has studied the
impact on the level of prices and on the volatility of prices separately, we model
both effects simultaneously.
This simultaneous estimation approach allows us to gain some interesting insights
into the processing of information. Non-anticipated information leads to a sharp and
consistent price reaction suggesting that traders’ average believes shift almost in-
stantaneously. Nevertheless, after controlling for the effect on the mean we still find
a strong and persistent increase in volatility which points to considerable disagree-
ment among traders about the precise implications of macroeconomic news. These
differences of opinion about the new equilibrium price are resolved only slowly.
Furthermore, we delineate the different modes of impact of non-anticipated informa-
tion on volatility: We find that traders’ uncertainty increases with the magnitude of
surprises. ’Bad’ news irritate traders considerably more than ’good’ news. Surprises
in similar headline figures pointing into the same direction ’re-enforce’ the price
signal. Hence, leaving less room for differences of opinion, volatility is found to be
decreased after such signals.
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Abstract
This paper delineates the simultaneous impact of non-anticipated informa-
tion on first and second moments of the intraday price process by including
appropriate variables accounting for the news flow into both the mean and
the variance function. This allows us to differentiate between the consistent
price reaction to surprising news and traders’ uncertainty about the precise
price impact of this information. Analyzing the US employment report, we
find that headline information is almost instantaneously incorporated into
T-bond futures prices. Nevertheless, large surprises create considerable uncer-
tainty, in particular ’bad’ news. In contrast, if surprises in related headlines
cross-validate each other, less room for differences of opinion is left, and hence
volatility is decreased.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the processing of macroeconomic news in financial markets,
in particular surprises in headline figures of the US employment report. We model
simultaneously two effects of public news arrival: On the one hand, non-anticipated
information in public news induces a shift in traders’ beliefs about the equilibrium
price level which should result in a sharp and immediate price reaction. While av-
erage beliefs shift instantaneously, on the other hand, traders do not have to agree
about the precise price impact of a given piece of information. Uncertainty about the
new equilibrium price level causes prices to fluctuate more widely around the new
equilibrium level until a new consensus is reached. We disentangle these effects by
controlling for the impact of non-anticipated information on both the mean and the
variance function. Instead of focussing on forecasts of the variance of returns after
controlling for some seasonalities in signed returns, we model traders’ uncertainty
about the precise price impact of new information while controlling for the shift in
traders’ beliefs.
From the previous literature it is well known that information arrival has an impact
on both prices and volatility in financial markets (see e.g., Goodhart and O’Hara
1997 for an overview).1 Nevertheless, previous empirical studies on announcement
effects have either focused on the impact of scheduled announcements on signed
returns (e.g. Berkman 1978, Urich and Wachtel 1984, Hardouvelis 1988, Fleming
and Remolona 1997, and Hess 2001) or on the volatility of returns (e.g. Harvey and
Huang 1991, Ederington and Lee 1993, Fleming and Remolona 1999a, and Franke
1There is also some tradition using volatility as a proxy for information arrival. See, e.g. Lam-
oureux and Lastrapes (1990) or Franke and Hess (2000b).
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and Hess 2000a) neglecting relations between the impact of non-anticipated infor-
mation on first and second moments.2 We close this apparent gap of the literature
by modelling the impact of announcements on both the mean and variance function
simultaneously. Our approach provides some interesting insights into the processing
of information. It enables us to distinguish between a volatility shock arising from a
news induced shift of the price to a new equilibrium and a situation in which prices
are just bouncing around, for example, because traders’ opinions diverge largely.
Non-anticipated information leads to a sharp and consistent price reaction suggest-
ing that traders’ average beliefs shift almost instantaneously. Nevertheless, after
controlling for the effect on the mean we still find a strong and persistent increase in
volatility which points to considerable disagreement among traders about the pre-
cise implications of macroeconomic news. These differences of opinion are resolved
only slowly.
We use high-frequency data of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) T-bond future
in order to investigate the effects of news arrival. One problem in this context is the
simultaneous occurrence of releases. To avoid an interference of effects caused by
multiple releases, in this study only one announcement is used, but a very important
one, i.e. the employment report.3 Besides being the most influential report, it has
the nice property that the overlap with other announcements is minimal. During the
five-year sample used here, i.e. January 1995 to December 1999, only 7 out of the 60
2Note that a few studies investigate both signed returns and absolute returns, as well as some
other variables such as trading volume or bid-ask spreads. For example, Fleming and Remolona
(1997) run separate regressions of signed returns on surprises as well as absolute returns and trading
volume on announcement dummies and absolute surprises. See also Balduzzi, Elton, and Green
(1997). Nevertheless, these studies do not model the simultaneous impact of announcements on
first and second moments.
3Several studies document that the employment report has by far the highest impact on the
mean function (e.g. Balduzzi, Elton, and Green 1997, Hess 2001) as well as the variance function
(Ederington and Lee 1993, Fleming and Remolona 1997).
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employment announcement days are lost due to an announcement of other releases
at the same time, i.e. 8:30 a.m. ET.4 In order to keep the results free from the
influence of announcements made at 10:00 a.m. on some of the employment report
days, we focus on a 90-minute window in which information processing should be
driven almost completely by the employment release.
The effects of information arrival are analyzed by means of an intraday ARCH model
with multiplicative heteroscedasticity on 2-min returns. Explanatory variables which
capture the time pattern and the impact of surprises are included in the mean
function as well as in the variance specification. In order to analyze the explanatory
power of the different model components their predictive performance is evaluated
separately. This allows us to differentiate between the explanatory power of the
implemented ARCH component, the variables capturing deterministic time patterns,
and the additional explanatory variables, i.e. surprises in headline figures.
Based on this estimation approach, we provide several contributions to the previous
literature. In particular, we disentangle the simultaneous impact of information ar-
rival on first and second moments of the return process. Furthermore, we delineate
the different modes of impact of non-anticipated information on volatility: absolute
effects, asymmetric impacts, and a ’re-enforcement’ effect. We provide some evi-
dence that traders’ differences of opinion increase with the magnitude of a surprise.
’Bad’ news irritate traders considerably more than ’good’ news. Surprises in similar
headline figures pointing into the same direction ’re-enforce’ the price signal, and
thus leave less room for differences of opinion.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section reviews
4This includes an inadvertently early release of the November 1998 employment report. See
Fleming and Remolona (1997).
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briefly the related literature. Section 3 characterizes the major information compo-
nents in the employment report. Moreover, several hypotheses are derived concerning
the processing of outstanding information. Section 4 describes the data, explains the
estimation procedure, and presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Previous studies - a synthesis
The previous literature on announcement effects can be divided into two branches,
one focussing on first moments, the other one on second moments. The first branch
analyzes the signed price impact of non-anticipated information. The main question
of this literature is which types of announcements significantly affect the equilibrium
price level. Usually, these studies measure the magnitude of surprises employing sur-
vey data on analysts’ forecasts for certain headline figures contained in macroeco-
nomic reports. Non-anticipated information is then measured by the deviation of a
given headline figure (Aτ ) announced at time τ from the median of analysts’ fore-
casts (Fτ ). Hence, the surprise in the ith headline figure is given as Si,τ = Ai,τ−Fi,τ .
Typically, the impact on the return in period t is investigated by regressing signed
log returns rt on surprises in some set of macroeconomic announcements (i=1,. . . ,n),
i.e.




where Di,t=τ denotes headline specific dummy variables which take on the value 1 if
announcement i is made during the interval t, and 0 else. In addition, lagged returns
or terms controlling for seasonalities in returns such as day-of-the-week effects may
be included in such an analysis.5 Heteroscedasticity in the error term εt is usually
5See, for example, Fleming and Remolona (1997) or Hess (2001).
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not explicitly modelled. Instead, some heteroscedasticity consistent estimator for the
variance-covariance matrix is applied.
Early studies investigate the impact of announcements on daily returns. For exam-
ple, Berkman (1978), and Urich and Wachtel (1981, 1984) analyze money growth
announcements, Cook and Korn (1991) and Prag (1994) focus on employment re-
ports. After the Federal Reserve deemphasized monetary aggregates to guide its
policy actions in the early 1980s, Hardouvelis (1988), Dwyer and Hafer (1989), and
Edison (1996), among others, find a growing influence of employment figures, re-
leases of consumer and producer prices, durable goods orders and retail sales. While
these studies examine daily data, mainly from bond markets, Becker, Finnerty, and
Kopecky (1996), Fleming and Remolona (1997, 1999b), and Hess (2001) focus on
narrow intraday windows around the announcements in order to separate the im-
pact of scheduled announcements from other not explicitly observed news which
may arrive occasionally over the course of a trading day. As a consequence, these
studies find that more types of announcements have a significant impact on bond
prices. Overall, studies on first moments suggest a significant and immediate adjust-
ment of the level of prices to non-anticipated information. In particular, surprising
information in the employment report triggers the most pronounced price responses.
A second branch of the literature on announcement effects analyzes volatility shocks.
First of all, these studies show that scheduled macroeconomic announcements stand
out from the steady flow of information which hits financial markets. Fleming and
Remolona (1997) find that out of the 25 largest intraday price changes in the U.S.
treasury market all but one occurred after such an announcement, in particular,
after employment reports. This is confirmed by Bollerslev, Cai, and Song (2000) for
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T-bond futures, and Dominguez (1999) obtains similar results for DEM/USD spot
rate.6 In contrast to studies on first moments, the literature on second moments
usually does not account for surprises in releases. In general, the impact of the mere
existence of an announcement is investigated, for example, by regressing absolute
log returns, |rt|, on the above defined dummy variables which account for the timing
of announcements only, i.e.7




Constructing such dummy variables from the schedule of macroeconomic releases
Harvey and Huang (1991), Ederington and Lee (1993), Crain and Lee (1995), Franke
and Hess (2000a), and others document that quite a number of different types of
releases have a significant impact on (intraday) volatility, mainly in bond and foreign
exchange markets.
The persistence of volatility after such an announcement is another issue which
has gained widespread attention. Ederington and Lee (1993), for example, analyze
the sample variance in 5-minute intervals across announcement days and find that
volatility is significantly higher in the interval associated with the announcement
and that it declines rapidly afterwards. This is confirmed for several markets by
various other studies (e.g. Ederington and Lee 1995, Crain and Lee 1995, Balduzzi,
Elton, and Green 1997, Fleming and Remolona 1999a, and Franke and Hess 2000a).
Most intraday studies suggest that the volatility shock is only short-lived. Volatility
seems to persist somewhat longer in more liquid instruments (Christie-David and
6However, it is not clear whether these findings are due to consistent price reactions to new
information or just volatility shocks.
7See, for example, Ederington and Lee (1993) or Fleming and Remolona (1997). In general,
seasonalities in volatilities such as day-of-week or time-of-the-day effects are controlled for by
including appropriately defined additional dummy variables.
6
Chaudhry 1999).
Based on the framework of Andersen and Bollerslev (1997), Bollerslev, Cai, and Song
(2000) investigate intraday seasonal patterns in volatility after controlling for inter-
day GARCH effects. On the basis of a switching GARCH model, Jones, Lamont,
and Lumsdaine (1998) as well as Jones (1998) find no significantly higher interday
volatility persistence after the release of the employment report and the producer
price index. In contrast, disentangling dynamic GARCH effects and announcement
effects, Li and Engle (1998) are able to reject the hypothesis that volatility persis-
tence from announcement days is the same as from non-announcement days. More-
over, they present evidence in favor of the ”calm before the storm” effect, i.e. that
volatility on pre-announcement days is significantly reduced. Li and Engle estimate
a filtered GARCH model which in its simplest form can be written as
rt = c+ ftεt
ht = ω + αε
2




with εt = htut and ut ∼ N(0, 1). Here, announcement day dummies (Dt) and day-
of-the-week dummies (Wt) enter the filter ft, not the GARCH equation ht. Iεt−1<0 is
an indicator variable taking on the value 1 for a negative εt−1 and zero else. Hence
this approach allows to account for asymmetric ARCH effects. Li and Engle also
test for the impact of ’bad’ news in announcements on the persistence of volatil-
ity by augmenting the GARCH equation with appropriate indicator variables. ’Bad’
news, however, is not measured by the sign of surprises in individual headline figures
(i.e. St = Ft−At) like in studies on first moments. Instead, the sign of the announce-
ment day’s return is used to assess whether a release provided ’good’ or ’bad’ news
7
(i.e. Iεt−1<0). Li and Engle find that the conditional volatility on post-announcement
days is significantly higher when a negative return on the announcement day was
observed, i.e. when ’bad’ news occurred.
Overall, studies on second moments do not account for the consistent price reaction
to non-anticipated information arrival which is well documented by studies on first
moments. Usually second moments studies are concerned with volatility forecasting,
mainly from a pre-announcements perspective. Hence only information available
before an announcement is regarded to be relevant. However, an important questions
is whether the observed volatility spike after macroeconomic announcements is just
due to a news induced jump of the price to a new equilibrium level.
Therefore, we control for the price impact of non-anticipated information by in-
cluding appropriate news flow variables into the mean function. Let rt denote the
2-minute log return associated with the interval t, with t = 1, . . . , T . Then, the mean
function of rt is modelled as
rt = x
′
tβ + ²t, ²t = utσt, ut ∼ N(0, 1), (1)
where β is a coefficient vector and xt denotes the corresponding vector of explanatory
variables. Note that xt includes a constant as well as surprises in individual headline
figures (see section 4 for more details on the specific definition of variables).
We investigate the creation of uncertainty about the precise price impact of new
information. Hence we model the variance of ²t, i.e. σ
2
t (²t) = σ
2
t , rather than the
variance of (centered) returns, rt − c. Including also information variables into the







allows us to study the impact of new information on traders’ uncertainty. In par-
ticular, wt includes absolute surprises as well as signed surprises in the individual
headline figures of the employment report (see section 4 for more details). Note that
wt includes a constant term. γ is the corresponding coefficient vector. Estimating
equations (1) and (2) simultaneously, our approach may be viewed as a synthesis of
the previous literature on first and second moments.
3 Information diffusion in efficient markets
What is it that makes markets react so sharply to macroeconomic announcements?
How does the price adjustment process to non-anticipated information work? In
order to analyze these and other questions, first the information content of the
major headline figures of an employment report is described. Hypotheses concerning
the impact of this information on the mean and variance of returns are presented
thereafter.
3.1 The information content of the employment report
Several studies have documented that the monthly report on the U.S. employment
situation prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) is the most influential
macroeconomic release for financial markets.8 Its importance stems from the fact
that it is an extremely timely and comprehensive measure of economic activity. Non-
farm payroll employment, for example, is commonly seen as a coincident indicator
8See, for example, Bollerslev, Cai, and Song (2000) or Fleming and Remolona (1999a) for its
impact on intraday volatility and Fleming and Remolona (1997) or Hess (2001) for its intraday
price impact. Nevertheless, on the basis of daily data Li and Engle (1998), for example, only find
an insignificantly higher impact and an insignificantly stronger persistence of this report.
9
of the business cycles.9 Moreover, both payroll employment as well as the unem-
ployment rate provide a measure of the tightness of the labor market and thus an
indication of price pressures in probably the most important input factor, i.e labor.
The employment report is a rather voluminous document containing quite an amount
of detail information. This is one reason why previous studies have focused on head-
line figures which summarize this information. Another reason is the availability
of so-called consensus forecasts of these figures which allow to measure the non-
anticipated part of information arrival. While some studies present evidence that
analysts’ forecasts of macroeconomic figures are not always unbiased and efficient,
test results are rather instable across different sample periods. For example, it is
hard to detect stable autocorrelation patterns in analysts’ forecasts errors. On the
other hand, the forecast performance of analysts is particularly low for reports being
announced early in the release cycle, as it is the case with the employment report.10
Previous studies of the employment report restrict their attention to two headline
figures, the nonfarm payroll measure and the unemployment rate. For example,
Hardouvelis (1988), Dwyer and Hafer (1989) and Prag (1994) analyze surprises in
unemployment rates, while Fleming and Remolona (1997) use nonfarm payrolls.
Some authors employ both nonfarm payrolls and unemployment rates, for example,
Cook and Korn (1991), Edison (1996), Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (1997), and Hess
(2001). However, none of these studies uses the hourly earnings figure.11 In this
paper, all three aforementioned headline figures are analyzed, i.e. nonfarm payrolls,
9See, for example Rogers (1998, ch. 1).
10As a comparison of the standard deviation of changes in announced headline figures and ana-
lysts’ forecast errors reveals, analysts are not able to reduce the uncertainty of market participants
for any of the three employment headline series. See, e.g. Hess and Moersch (2001).
11Probably due to the fact that most survey agencies did not collect forecasts for this headline
figure before 1995.
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unemployment rates, and average hourly earnings.12
Payroll employment as well as the unemployment rate provide market participants
with several indications about current economic conditions. Both figures are mea-
sures of overall economic activity. In addition, both are commonly seen to be an
indicator of consumers’ spending power. Moreover, they provide an indication of
price pressures arising from the labor market. No matter what interpretation mar-
ket participants might like best, note that the information content of payrolls and
(un)employment rates is strongly related. Therefore, it may be argued that using
one of these figures is enough to capture most of the information. However, although
they show similar fluctuations over the long run, both are derived from different
sources. While the unemployment rate figure is derived from the household survey,
the payroll measure (like hourly earnings) is based on the much larger establish-
ment survey.13 Hence, over the short term they can move into opposite directions.
One argument that market participants consider the nonfarm payroll figure to be
more important, is that changes in nonfarm payrolls are less volatile than changes
in unemployment rates.14
As mentioned above, financial markets also try to infer from employment figures
whether inflationary pressures are building up which may arise from an increased
bargaining power of employees in a tight labor market. A related but more direct
12A fourth headline figure which receives attention from time to time is the average workweek,
i.e. the average number of hours worked. This measure is not employed here since MMS does not
provide survey data for this figure before October 1998. Hence, only a few data points are available.
13The unemployment rate figure counts civilian noninstitutional employees including agricultural
workers as well as self-employed persons. In contrast, nonfarm payrolls measure the number of jobs
added in nonagricultural industries. Double-counting from persons who hold multiple jobs is not
avoided. See, for example, Rogers (1998) ch. 1, or Niemira and Zukowski (1998) ch. 10.
14In fact, during our sample period the standard deviation of relative month-over-month changes
in nonfarm payrolls turns out to be 0.119%, in unemployment rates 0.161%, and in hourly earnings
0.244%. See also Hess and Moersch (2001).
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information is obtained from average hourly earnings. Obviously, this figure pro-
vides a straightforward reading of price changes in the input factor labor. However,
while hourly earnings primarily measure current price pressures, trends in employ-
ment may allow market participants to foresee wage increases down the road. Hence,
hourly earnings add to the picture of price trends sketched by payrolls and unem-
ployment rates by providing a look back.
Due to the above described differences in the information content of headline figures
one would expect that surprises in any of the three headline figures contribute to the
explanation of returns observed after an announcement. Prices in financial markets
should adjust immediately to a surprise in any figure to which market participants
assign some importance.15 This is stated by hypothesis H1.
H1: Informativeness of headline figures
After an announcement, prices react significantly to non-anticipated informa-
tion in headline figures. All three headline figures contribute to the explanation
of returns.
3.2 Efficient processing of non-anticipated information
According to the well-known efficient market hypothesis one would expect that prices
adjust immediately to public news arrival if this information is regarded to be im-
portant. However, only non-anticipated information can move prices, because in an
efficient market prices already reflect widely anticipated events. The unique dissem-
ination procedure of statistical agencies in the US guarantees that macroeconomic
15We would not be able to say which figure is more important if surprises in some figures are
perfectly correlated. However, if this is not the case we can investigate their incremental explanatory
power.
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reports are released precisely according to the schedule.16 Reporters are allowed to
analyze the data in advance but they are not allowed to communicate until the offi-
cial release time. When the phone lines are turned on exactly at 8:30 a.m., headline
figures are transmitted almost immediately to traders on the floor as well as other
market participants via news agencies. Thus, the most obvious non-anticipated in-
formation, i.e. surprises in headline figures should be incorporated into prices within
a few minutes (hypothesis H2). The time span until this information is fully incor-
porated into prices may serve as a measure of market efficiency in terms of the speed
of information diffusion.
H2: Immediate price impact of headline information
In an efficient market prices adjust immediately to non-anticipated information
in the widely awaited headline figures. Thus no systematic impact can be found
after a few minutes.
Hypotheses H1 and H2 refer to the impact of information arrival on the mean func-
tion. The following section deals with the implications for the variance function.
3.3 The volatility impact of information arrival
The sharply increased volatility immediately after macroeconomic announcements
as well as its persistence is well documented (e.g. Ederington and Lee 1993, Crain
and Lee 1995, Fleming and Remolona 1997, 1999a and Franke and Hess 2000a). In
order to delineate the impact of macroeconomic announcements on volatility, we
16See, for example, Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995) or Fleming and Remolona (1997, 1999a)
for a detailed description of these procedures.
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differentiate between four components: (1) the impact of the mere existence of new
information, i.e. the baseline volatility time pattern related to the announcement
of the employment report, (2) the magnitude of non-anticipated information in this
report, i.e. absolute surprises in headline figures, (3) the asymmetric impact of good
and bad news on volatility, i.e. signed surprises, and (4) the ’re-enforcement’ effect
of surprises in related headline figure, i.e. whether surprises in newly created jobs
(payrolls) and the overall (un)employment rate convey the same message.
The first component captures a volatility increase due to an acceleration of the speed
of information diffusion after an announcement. This component accounts for the
well-known effect that information arrival is associated with higher trading volume
as well as higher volatility (for a comprehensive overview see e.g. Karpoff 1987 or
Goodhart and O’Hara 1997). Note that this component does not account for specific
details concerning the type of information, the magnitude, or direction of surprises.
Hence, it captures the deterministic time pattern of volatility around announcements
as a baseline. One argument for a persistently higher volatility after announcements
stems from the mixture of distribution hypothesis (Clark 1973, Harris 1987) stat-
ing that both volume and volatility are driven by the rate of information arrival.
Clusters in news then lead to a positively autocorrelated volatility. Considering that
an employment report contains a load of detail information besides the exposed
headline figures and assuming that this information is only gradually processed, the
mixture of distribution hypothesis provides one explanation for volatility clustering
after such a report. A somewhat related argument is provided by the sequential
information arrival model (Copeland 1976, 1987) which assumes that not all market
participants receive the information at the same time.17 Another argument is that
17This view is supported for example by Dacorogna, Mu¨ller, Nagler, Olsen, and Pictet (1993)
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even if market participants have the same access to the information at the same
time, differences of opinion about its price impact can persist for quite some time
(e.g. Varian 1985, Kandel and Pearson 1995, or Harris and Raviv 1993). Market
participants may interpret the data differently, either if they have additional private
information, different prior beliefs, or if they use different models to evaluate the
impact of news. Hypothesis H3 summarizes these arguments:
H3: Baseline volatility after an announcement
Volatility increases immediately after an employment release and declines only
slowly afterwards.
The effect of an employment announcement on the volatility before this event is less
clear. On the one hand there is some evidence that trading volume declines before
such an announcement.18 Then, the well-documented positive volume-volatility re-
lation (see e.g. Karpoff 1987) would suggest that volatility before an announcement
is lower. However, a possible counterargument arise from the liquidity of markets. If
speculative trading dries out, liquidity trades may have a higher price impact. This
would increase volatility before an announcement.19 Hypothesis H4 follows the first
line of reasoning suggesting a ”clam before the storm” effect.
and Mu¨ller, Dacorogna, Dave´, Olsen, Pictet, and von Weizsa¨cker (1997) who argue that different
market participants have different time horizons to process information and to act upon it. This
leads to waves in trading activity and thus to waves in price volatility.
18Fleming and Remolona (1999a), for example, report that trading volume in U.S. Treasuries is
slightly but insignificantly lower before an announcement. Franke and Hess (2000a) find that Bund
future trading volume is significantly lower in the five minute interval preceding 8:30 announcements
and insignificantly lower before releases scheduled at 9:15 and 10:00 ET.
19See, for example, Franke and Hess (2000a).
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H4: Baseline volatility before an announcement
Volatility is depressed before an announcement.
The second component in the variance specification accounts for the magnitude of
non-anticipated information in a report, measured by the deviation of announced
headline figures from analysts’ ’consensus’ forecasts. It seems to be unclear why
large surprises should lead to higher volatility, especially if one controls for the
direct impact of surprises on the mean function. Since these surprises have a high
visibility, i.e. market participants get the information very fast via news vendors
such as Bloomberg or Reuters, one would expect an immediate and consistent price
reaction rather than a prolonged stage of random fluctuations. One explanation for
a persistently high volatility could be that a surprise in a headline figure increases
the probability that there are also surprises in other less exposed figures and that it
is not easy for market participants to find out what else might be affected. Therefore
market participants may have more difficulties in assessing the precise price impact
of larger surprises. In addition, surprises leave more room for differences of opinion
if one considers the possibility of imprecise measurements. For example, it may be
unclear whether a surprise is due to a measurement error, i.e. market participants
may disagree about the precision of the signal. Extreme surprises may even call the
reliability of forecast models in question. This is stated by hypothesis H5.
H5: Volatility impact of the magnitude of surprises
Larger surprises give rise to more pronounced differences of opinion. Hence,
volatility increases with the magnitude of surprises.
The third volatility component allows to investigate whether ’good’ and ’bad’ news
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have a different impact on volatility (hypothesis H6). On the basis of daily data
Li and Engle (1998), for example, report strong asymmetric effects of scheduled
announcements. They find that positive shocks depress volatility on consecutive
days and vice versa. While Li and Engle define ’good’ and ’bad’ news on the basis
of the observed daily return reactions, in this study the sign of analysts’ forecast
errors in the headline figures is exploited directly to asses whether a surprise provides
’good’ or ’bad’ news.20 Therefore, asymmetric effects can be investigated for each of
the headline figures separately.
H6: Asymmetric volatility impact of surprises
Traders’ uncertainty, and thus volatility, is higher for ’bad’ news than for ’good’
news.
The fourth volatility component is included in order to investigate a possible in-
teraction between surprises in headline figures in more detail. Recall that both the
nonfarm payrolls figure and the (un)employment rate may indicate future price pres-
sures arising from a tight labor market. Since these two figures are closely related,
market participants can use them to cross-validate each other. If both headline fig-
ures convey the same message, e.g. a surprisingly high increase in nonfarm payrolls
and a lower than expected unemployment rate, the room for differences of opinion
about a tight labor market is reduced. A large surprise in one headline figure might
be interpreted as a measurement error. If large surprises in both figures occur which
point into the same direction, then the possibility of a measurement error is rather
20Li and Engle (1998) define, for example, ’big negative news’ as news corresponding with (daily)
returns lower than 33% quantile. In contrast, here, ’bad’ news is given by a higher than expected
nonfarm payrolls figure (S1+), a lower than predicted unemployment rate (S2−), and a higher
than forecasted average hourly earnings announcement (S3+).
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reduced. In this case, one would expect a sharp initial price reaction, but on the
other hand volatility afterwards should be comparatively low. In other words, we
should observe a more moderate increase in volatility if large surprises in nonfarm
payrolls and the unemployment rate cross-validate each other.21 Hence, the fourth
component examines whether multiple surprises pointing into the same direction
reduce the room for differences of opinion (hypothesis H7).
H7: Re-enforcement effect of surprises in related figures
Volatility is lower if large surprises in the related nonfarm payrolls figure and
the unemployment rate mutually confirm their messages, i.e. if both provide
either ’good’ or ’bad’ news, since then less room is left for differences of opin-
ion. Moreover, this effect is more pronounced for negative surprises given the
existence of asymmetric effects (H6)
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data
We analyze Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) T-bond futures returns in 2-minute
intervals during a 90-minute window around employment releases, more precisely
from 8:22 to 9:52 a.m. ET (Eastern time). This windows is suggested on the one hand
by the floor trading hours of the CBOT which start at 8:20 a.m.,22 on the other hand
by the release of other macroeconomic announcements at 10:00 a.m. Log returns are
calculated on the basis of the last trading price observed in a given 2-minute interval.
21A ’large’ surprise will be defined as a surprise exceeding one standard deviation.
22The definition of 2-minute returns does not allow to calculate a return for the 8:20-8:22 interval
since no price is observed before 8:20.
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For example, the return associated with the employment release, i.e. the 8:30-8:32
return, is computed from the last price before the 8:30 announcement and the last
price before 8:32. We only use those Fridays on which no other macroeconomic report
is released during the 90-minute period. Using a five-year sample, i.e. January 1995 to
December 1999, we obtain 53 trading days.23 Since the employment report is released
almost always on Fridays, we do not have to account for day-of-the-week effects.24
CBOT T-Bond futures data are obtained from the Futures Industry Institute. These
are ’tick-by-tick’ data containing a time-stamped record whenever a price change is
observed. Transaction volumes are not recorded. Like in previous studies, the front
month contract is analyzed, i.e. the most actively traded contract among the nearby
and second nearby contract.25 As an illustration for the impact of announcements,
the 1% and 99% as well as the 5% and 95% fractiles of 2-minute log returns are
shown in figure 1.
[insert figure 1 around here]
In order to explore the effect of the bid-ask bounce on the results, some experiments
are conducted using log returns computed on the basis of so-called ’pseudo equi-
librium prices’ as suggested by Ederington and Lee (1995). These are obtained as
the average of the last two prices in an interval. However, the results do not change
237 trading days are removed at which either leading indicators, personal income, or gross do-
mestic product were released at the same time.
24Typically, the employment report is released on the first Friday after the end of the month
it refers to. During the sample period 3 reports were announced on a Thursday since the first
Friday was a holiday. Moreover, controlling for the impact of announcements Li and Engle (1998)
do not find a significant difference between Thursdays and Fridays. This is in line with the findings
of Ederington and Lee (1993), Franke and Hess (2000a), and others suggesting that most of the
day-of-week and time-of-the-day effects in bond markets can be explained by the announcement
schedule.
25See, for example, Ederington and Lee (1995) or Franke and Hess (2000a).
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in any meaningful aspect using ’pseudo equilibrium prices’. Neither coefficients in
the mean nor in the variance function are affected substantially. Although this is
somewhat in contrast to the results reported by Ederington and Lee (1995), it is
not surprising since a higher aggregation level is used. The influence of the bid-ask
spread on returns in very narrow ten-seconds intervals is much more pronounced
since price changes are much smaller as compared to 2-min intervals.26 In addition,
there seems to be a trade-off between the bias induced by the bid-ask spread, and
the bias induced by averaging over lagged prices especially during periods of dense
information arrival.
In order to evaluate the impact of non-anticipated information, data on analysts’
forecasts in three headline figures are used, i.e. changes in nonfarm payrolls, unem-
ployment rates, and average hourly earnings. Consensus forecasts, i.e. median ana-
lysts’ forecasts, of headline figures were generously provided by Standard & Poors
Global Markets (MMS). Initially released non-revised figures were extracted from
the original monthly BLS releases. Surprises are defined as the difference between
initially announced figures and the median analysts’ forecast. To facilitate a com-
parison between the headline figures standardized surprises are used, i.e. for each
headline surprises are divided by the sample standard deviation of surprises.
26The impact of the bid-ask spread depends on the size of the bid-ask bounce relative to average
(absolute) price changes in a given interval. 2-min intervals seem to be enough to eliminate the
influence of the bid-ask spread largely.
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4.2 Specification of the mean function
Let rt denote the 2-minute log return associated with the interval t, t = 1, . . . , T .
As mentioned above, the mean function of rt (eq. 1) is modelled as
rt = x
′
tβ + ²t, ²t = utσt, ut ∼ N(0, 1),
where xt denotes the vector of explanatory variables and β the corresponding coef-
ficient vector. The (conditional) variance function σt is not explicitly specified yet.
Here it is assumed to be time-invariant, i.e. σt = σ.
The response of the price process to the announcement of the above described three
headline figures in the employment report is analyzed based on explanatory variables
capturing surprises in each figure. Surprises in the three headline figures nonfarm
payrolls, unemployment rates, and hourly earnings are denoted by S1, S2, and S3,
respectively. In addition, time dummies are defined which take on the value 1 for a
given interval and zero else, i.e.
Dτ =
{
1 if t = τ
0 else,
where t = 1, . . . , 45 denotes the 2-minute intervals between 8:22 a.m. and 9:52 a.m.
Moreover, surprise dummies are defined for each 2-minute time interval such that
the surprise variables interact multiplicatively with the dummy variables, i.e.
Sτ = DτS, with S ∈ {S1, S2, S3}
For example, the interaction term S28:32−8:34 = D8:32−8:34 × S2 captures the impact
of a surprise in headline 2 on the return in the interval 8:32–8:34. In addition, lagged
2-minute log returns are included in the regressions.
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In a first step, we focus on first moments and analyze the impact of the different
types of information separately by running simple OLS regressions of 2-minute log
returns on different sets of the corresponding surprise variables. In all regressions
the above defined dummy variables cover the interval from 8:28 a.m. to 8:36 a.m.27
[insert table 1 around here]
As a benchmark, the first regression, i.e. specification (1) in table 1, includes only a
constant as well as lagged returns. The second regression (spec. 2) includes only vari-
ables capturing detailed information concerning the first headline figure, i.e. nonfarm
payrolls (S1). The following findings can be summarized:
First, the estimated coefficients provide evidence for a significant impact of the
surprise on the price, i.e. the higher the difference between the announced number
and the corresponding forecast, the stronger the resulting decline of the price.28
The strikingly high coefficient (in absolute terms) of the 8:30-8:32 surprise dummy
(S18:30−8:32) supports hypothesis H1 that the arrival of non-anticipated information
causes sharp price reactions.
Second, focusing on the time pattern of the price response induced by the payrolls
surprise we find significant price movements between two minutes before (S18:28−8:30)
and four minutes after the announcement (S18:30−8:32, S18:32−8:34). The significant
price reaction in the 8:28 to 8:30 interval provides some evidence for slight leakage
27We also included dummies capturing further intervals before and after the announcement but
did not find any significant impacts.
28Note that a higher than expected outcome of nonfarm payrolls as well as of hourly earnings is
’bad news’ and should lead to an increase in interest rates and a decline in T-bond futures prices.
In contrast, a lower than expected unemployment rate is also seen to be ’bad news’ for T-bond
futures.
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effects. This result is quite surprising since strict lock-up conditions should rule out
any leakage of information.29 However, the largest price reaction is observed within
the 8:30-8:32 interval. This reaction sharply declines between 8:32-8:34 and disap-
pears within the following 2-minute interval. These results indicate that the T-bond
futures market rapidly advances towards a new equilibrium level after the arrival
of non-anticipated information. Thus, the finding of a high speed of information
diffusion strongly supports hypothesis H2.
The above described analysis is repeated for the remaining two headline figures,
i.e. the unemployment rate S2 and hourly earnings S3. Regression results are given
in columns (3) and (4) of table 1. Again, surprises in these headline figures cause
strong price responses within the 8:30-8:32 interval coinciding with the announce-
ment, although the reaction to surprises in hourly earnings seems to be slightly less
significant (at the 10% level). Note, however, that the significance of this headline
figure is increased if the other figures are included, too (column 5). After 8:32 no
statistically significant influence of other figures than nonfarm payrolls is found.
Hence, non-anticipated information associated with the unemployment rate and
hourly earnings seems to be processed even more rapidly. The adjustment is ba-
sically completed within two minutes after the release. Moreover, note that the
signs of the estimated coefficients support the hypothesized price reactions. T-bond
futures prices rise in response to ’good’ news from the inflation front, i.e. a lower
than expected increase in nonfarm payrolls, a higher than expected unemployment
rate, and a lower than expected average hourly earnings figure.
In regressions (5) and (6) the joint impact of the different types of non-anticipated
29However, note that if we model the mean and the variance simultaneously, the significance of
this effect is reduced. See the results provided in the following section.
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information is evaluated. A very important result is that the estimated coefficients
remain relatively stable when additional explanatory variables, i.e. surprises in the
other headline figures, are included. In general, the significance of the variables
is nearly unchanged which illustrates the robustness of the results. These findings
indicate that each of the different types of non-anticipated information contributes
to the explanation of the return process which provides strong evidence in favor
of hypothesis H1. Thus, market participants do not only assign weight to nonfarm
payrolls but also pay attention to unemployment rates and hourly earnings.
In order to achieve a more parsimonious representation of the mean function, in
regression (6) only those surprise variables are included which turned out to be
significant in the previous regressions. Note that virtually no change in the estimated
coefficients is recorded. In addition, one lagged return is included.
An interesting issue is the relative importance of the individual headline figures.
Therefore, the explanatory power of these components is evaluated on the basis
of the coefficient of explained variation R2 by regressing the 2-minute log returns
on the predictions given by the individual models (1 to 6) via OLS. Results of this
estimation are given in last two lines of table 1, i.e. an F-test (zero intercept and slope
one) as well as the resulting R2. The F statistics (Fα0=0,α1=1) on H0 : α0 = 0, α1 = 1
are based on the regressions rt = α0+α1rˆt, where rˆt denotes the predictions obtained
from a given model. For all the regressions, the F statistics are virtually zero due to
the fact that α0s and α1s are very close to 0 and 1, respectively. Hence, none of the
models yields biased predictions.
The analysis of the predictive power of the models yields some interesting insights:
First, accounting for autocorrelation in returns without including surprise variables
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(column 1) explains virtually nothing (R2 = 0.1%). Second, including surprise vari-
ables results in a substantial increase of the explained variation of returns. The
inclusion of nonfarm payroll information yields the largest increase in explanatory
power which confirms hypothesis H1. In particular, including the surprise dum-
mies based on announced payrolls 15.3% of the total variation can be explained
while with unemployment information ’only’ 13.7% and with average hourly earn-
ings 5.4% can be explained. The employment release is often referred to as ’the
king of announcements’.30 The results of these regressions suggest that the nonfarm
payroll component ’wields the scepter’. Nevertheless, hourly earnings which is often
neglected still has some explanatory power. Third, including all three headline fig-
ures (model 5) explains 30.7 % of the total variation which is a quite satisfying result
for an intraday return process. The strongly reduced model which includes only the
significant variables (column 6) explains 30.5% of the variation.31 This confirms that
the insignificant variables of the previous specifications explain almost nothing.
4.3 Specification of the variance function
Besides the analysis of the price impact a further main issue in this paper is the
investigation of the variance impact of the arrival of non-anticipated information.
To analyze the time pattern of the volatility response we use an ARCH specification
with multiplicative heteroscedasticity. While in the previous section the variance σ2t






30See, for example, Li and Engle (1998) or Andersen and Bollerslev (1998).
31A constant term and one lag of returns is also included although both variables turned out to
be insignificant in most of the other models (1 to 5).
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where wt is a vector of explanatory variables entering the variance specification
collectively as multiplicative heteroscedasticity. Note that wt includes a constant
term. γ is the corresponding coefficient vector. This specification allows to model the
direct impact of explanatory variables on the variance. Since we are mainly interested
in the variance response due to surprise effects and not in the volatility persistence
and long memory effects, only three ARCH terms are included. No GARCH term is
included.32
In order to separate the effects of news arrival on the mean and the variance function,
first, we model the mean function by a constant term
rt = β0 + ²t. (3)
Estimation results for the corresponding ARCH models are given in table 2. This
facilitates a comparison with the previous literature.
[insert table 2 around here]
Second, using a completely specified mean function (eq. 1) allows us to analyze the
simultaneous impact of surprises on first and second moments. In particular, we use
the mean specification of column (6) in table 1. Estimation results are given in table
3.
[insert table 3 around here]
As a starting point, a simple ARCH(3) specification is given in column (1) of tables
2 and 3. It illustrates the existence of significant serial dependencies in the variance
32The implementation of a GARCH effect would lead to an inclusion of the explanatory variables
in the model dynamics which would complicate the interpretation of results.
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function. Interestingly, the ARCH effect is more pronounced with the fully specified
mean function. The ARCH(1) coefficient turns out to be 0.296 assuming a constant
mean function (table 2), and 0.521 for the completely specified mean function (table
3). Note that for all the models the significance of the ARCH(2) coefficients is sub-
stantially lower and the ARCH(3) term is insignificant. Furthermore, as additional
explanatory variables are added, in particular the dummies capturing the determin-
istic pattern of the variance around announcements, the magnitude of the ARCH(1)
coefficient is substantially reduced (below 0.1), although it remains significant at
the 1% level.
Columns (2) to (6) show the results of an ARCH model with multiplicative het-
eroscedasticity. The model given in column (2) accounts for the deterministic pat-
tern of volatility by including a set of time dummies covering the period from 8:26
a.m. to 9:40 a.m. Note that the base category is the time before the announcement
(8:22-8:26) and the last 12 minutes of the analyzed time interval (9:40-9:52). This
categorization is quite reasonable as it allows us to analyze the variance response
due to announcement effects compared with the variance level before and a longer
time after the announcement. The variance peaks in the interval just after the an-
nouncement (8:30-8:32) and declines almost monotonically until about one hour
after the event. After this period we do not find significant differences compared to
the volatility level of the base category. Since the explanatory variables enter the
variance equation exponentially, at its peak between 8:30 and 8:32, the variance is
more than 50 times higher than the variance in the base period while it drops to
a factor of around 9 in the following interval. 30 minutes after the announcement,
the variance is just about twice as high as in the base period. Thus, we find an
extreme volatility response immediately after the announcement followed by a rela-
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tively strong decline within the first minutes and a more slowly decaying structure a
longer time after the news arrival. Hence, these findings strongly support hypothesis
H3.
Furthermore, some empirical evidence is obtained that volatility starts to rise be-
tween 8:26 to 8:28 and shows a strong increase just before the announcement. There-
fore, hypothesis H4 is clearly rejected. The detection of a pre-announcement surge
in volatility is in line with the results of Ederington and Lee (1996), Fleming and
Remolona (1999a), Franke and Hess (2000a), and others. A further important find-
ing is a significant decrease of the ARCH coefficient compared to specification (1)
which indicates that the volatility response due to the arrival of non-anticipated
information seems to be a major source of autocorrelation in the volatility process.
In regressions (3) and (4) both variables accounting for the deterministic time pat-
tern and surprise variables are included. In column (3) variables capturing the mag-
nitude of surprises in the three headline figures are added, i.e. absolute surprises
(|S1|, |S2|, and |S3|). Column (4) allows to investigate asymmetric effects by adding
signed surprises (S1, S2, and S3). Interestingly, only the nonfarm payrolls and aver-
age hourly earnings seem to have a significant impact on the variance. Note, however,
that also |S2| is found to be significant when additional variables enter the variance
specification. Nevertheless, a stable result is that a large surprise leads to higher
variance (column 3). In addition, the results in column (4) suggest a significant
positive impact of ’bad’ news for S1 and S3.33 No significant asymmetric influence
is found for S2. Note that while the significance of the results is increased when
additional variables enter the variance specification, the structure of these results
33Recall that positive surprises in S1 and S3 cause negative price movements. In contrast,
negative price movements are caused by negative surprises in S2.
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remains stable. In connection with the specifications explained below, these results
strongly support both hypotheses H5 and H6.
The model in column (5) includes both types of surprise variables. Note that these
variables enter the variance specification multiplicatively, i.e. the surprise variables
interact with the complete set of time dummies leading to proportional downward
or upward shifts of the variance function. For all three type of surprise variables we
find a significantly positive impact on the variance. Thus, the higher the surprise
in absolute terms, the higher the resulting volatility. Again, this is in accordance
with hypothesis H5. Furthermore, the preliminary results of model (3) and (4) are
confirmed. We obtain empirical evidence for the existence of asymmetric effects for
surprises in nonfarm payrolls and hourly earnings. In particular, positive surprises,
i.e. negative shocks for the price process increase the volatility while negative sur-
prises depress the volatility.34
Finally, model (6) includes two interaction terms between surprises in nonfarm pay-
rolls and unemployment rates in order to test for the re-enforcement effect stated by
hypothesis H7. IS1
++S2−− takes on the value one if a large positive value for S1 and
at the same time a large negative value for S2 is observed and zero else. Here, large is
defined as exceeding one standard deviation. This dummy variable is interacted with
the time dummies, creating a separate variable for the interval 8:30 to 8:38 in which
volatility is extremely high, i.e. IS1
++S2−−
8:30−8:38 , and another variable for the subsequent
phase of rather moderately increased volatility, i.e. IS1
++S2−−
8:38−9:20 . As hypothesized by
H7, a strong and highly significant reduction of volatility is found if both headline
34Similar asymmetric effects associated with scheduled announcements have also been found by
Li and Engle (1998) based on daily data. However, Li and Engle define ’negative’ news indirectly
on the basis of the observed price reaction rather than including the signed surprise.
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figures convey extremely bad news and thus mutually reconfirm their messages. We
also analyzed positive re-enforcement effects, i.e. extremely ’good’ news in the two
headline figures, but these did not turn out to be significant. This result is in line
with the findings of asymmetric effects. In general, differences of opinion seem to
be more widespread inducing a larger increase in volatility when larger surprises
are observed (significantly positive |S1|, |S2|, and |S3| coefficients) and when the
news is ’bad’ rather than ’good’ (significantly positive S1, S3, and insignificantly
negative S2 coefficients). However, the room for differences in opinion seems to
be significantly reduced if reconfirmation of bad news reduces the possibility of a





8:38−9:20 coefficients). This provides strong evidence in favor of H7.
In order to evaluate the explanatory power of the different volatility specifications,
again their predictive performance is investigated on the basis of OLS regressions
of observed values on predicted values. In particular, the squared residuals ²ˆ2t are
regressed on the corresponding volatility forecasts σˆ2t . Also in this framework a good
prediction is indicated by a high R2 while the coefficient related to the explanatory
variable σˆ2t should equal one and the corresponding constant should be zero. The
corresponding F statistics as well as the R2s are given in the last two lines of tables
2 and 3.
Comparing the explanatory power of specifications (1) and (2) shows that the pre-
dictive performance increases substantially when explanatory variables capturing
the volatility response due to the announcement schedule are included. The basic
ARCH model provides rather poor results (1% with a constant mean function, ta-
ble 2, and 6.4% with a fully specified mean function, table 3). A huge increase of
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the explanatory power is observed when the dummies capturing the deterministic
time pattern around releases are included (22.1% and 15.6%, respectively). When
surprise variables are included in addition to the deterministic time pattern vari-
ables, another strong increase in the explanatory power is observed in the case of
a constant mean function (about 11% to 18%). This increase is more moderate in
the case of a fully specified mean function (about 2% to 6%). With an incompletely
specified mean function models (5) and (6) have almost the same predictive power.
However, with a fully specified mean function model (6) clearly outperforms model
(5) as well as the other specifications in table 2.
5 Conclusions
This paper scrutinizes the processing of information contained in the U.S. employ-
ment report. The impact of non-anticipated information arrival on both first and
second moments of the return process is analyzed. This allows some interesting
insights into the creation of uncertainty by the release of macroeconomic news.
In contrast to the previous literature which investigates volatility while refraining
from including variables to account for surprises into the mean function, we control
for the consistent price reaction to non-anticipated information. With a completely
specified mean function, the volatility function receives a different interpretation:
Rather than capturing just the fluctuations of squared returns, the volatility function
describes market participants’ uncertainty about the precise price impact of new
information, while the mean function describes the shift in average beliefs about the
new equilibrium price level induced by the arrival of non-anticipated information.
The main results derived on the basis of this estimation approach are as follows.
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First, surprises in all three headline figures have a distinct impact on the level of
prices, the nonfarm payrolls figure has the strongest impact. Second, non-anticipated
information leads to an almost instantaneous price reaction which is completed
within the first two to four minutes. This indicates that the market advances very
rapidly to a new equilibrium price level. Third, volatility is slightly higher before
the announcement, maybe due to a temporary illiquidity before the announcement.
Volatility surges immediately afterwards. In particular, volatility peaks in the 2-
minute interval associated with the announcement. Volatility is substantially re-
duced in the following interval, though remaining elevated for about one hour. The
high volatility after the announcement suggests that there is considerable uncer-
tainty about the precise price impact of new information. Forth, strong magnitude
effects of surprises are found to have an impact on volatility, i.e. larger surprises
do not only lead to a more pronounced price reaction, they also create more uncer-
tainty. Fifth, there are strong asymmetric effects, i.e. ’bad’ news measured in terms
of the surprises contained in headline figures raise the volatility substantially while
’good news’ reduce traders’ uncertainty. This suggests that market participants are
particularly upset when negative shocks occur. Last but not least, a strong interac-
tion between headline figures with a related information content is detected. Pointing
into the same direction, extremely bad news in the nonfarm payrolls figure re-enforce
the signal of a devastating unemployment rate reading. This cross-validation of ex-
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Figure 1: 2-min returns around employment releases
Descriptive statistics of 2-minute log returns (times 10000) during the interval 8:22 to
9:52 a.m. ET at employment announcement days are reported. The sample period is
January 1995 to December 1999, resulting in 53 days at which no other macroeconomic
report is released along with the employment report. 1% and 99% percentiles (solid
lines) are displayed as well as 5% and 95% percentiles (dotted lines).
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Table 1: Mean function estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
const −0.126 −0.084 0.008 −0.039 0.133 0.124
rt−1 −0.027 −0.081 ∗ −0.035 −0.024 −0.088 ∗ −0.073
S18:28−8:30 −3.664 ∗ −4.107 ∗∗ −3.675 ∗
S18:30−8:32 −29.006 ∗∗∗ −26.590 ∗∗∗ −26.528 ∗∗∗
S18:32−8:34 −7.310 ∗∗ −7.528 ∗∗ −7.075 ∗∗
S18:34−8:36 0.242 0.781
S28:28−8:30 −0.451 −1.619




S38:30−8:32 −19.762 ∗ −24.742 ∗∗∗ −24.748 ∗∗∗
S38:32−8:34 0.066 −2.634
S38:34−8:36 0.777 0.894
R¯2 0.001 0.152 0.135 0.052 0.303 0.303
regular F-test 0.360 5.446 ∗∗∗ 2.754 ∗∗ 0.682 6.420 ∗∗∗ 12.371 ∗∗∗
BIC −0.004 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.036 0.013
Fα0=0,α1=1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.001 0.153 0.137 0.054 0.307 0.305
OLS regressions of 2-minute log returns at employment report announcement days. The
sample period is January 1995 to December 1999. 53 days are used at which no other
report is announced along with the employment report. For each of these days the intraday
interval 8:22–9:52 ET is analyzed. The adjusted coefficient of determination (R¯2) is given
as well as the results of a regular F-test on the hypothesis of a zero coefficient vector. The
Schwartz information criterion (BIC) is also provided. In addition, the R2 from a regression
of observed returns on predicted returns is given along with the results of an F-test on the
joint hypothesis of a zero intercept and a unit slope (Fα0=0,α1=1). Inference is based on
robust standard errors.
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Table 2: Variance function estimates (assuming a constant mean)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean:
const 0.372 0.125 0.151 0.179 ∗ 0.178 ∗ 0.176 ∗
Variance:
const 4.626 ∗∗∗ 3.051 ∗∗∗ 2.489 ∗∗∗ 2.993 ∗∗∗ 2.591 ∗∗∗ 2.542 ∗∗∗
ε2t−1 0.296
∗∗ 0.106 ∗∗∗ 0.094 ∗∗∗ 0.079 ∗∗∗ 0.083 ∗∗∗ 0.081 ∗∗∗
ε2t−2 −0.001 0.037 ∗∗ 0.025 ∗ 0.024 ∗ 0.021 ∗ 0.021 ∗
ε2t−3 0.006 0.028 0.020 0.024 0.019 0.014
D8:26−8:28 0.690 ∗∗ 0.704 ∗∗ 0.624 ∗∗ 0.671 ∗∗ 0.673 ∗∗
D8:28−8:30 2.090 ∗∗∗ 2.073 ∗∗∗ 2.052 ∗∗∗ 2.028 ∗∗∗ 2.004 ∗∗∗
D8:30−8:32 4.968 ∗∗∗ 4.802 ∗∗∗ 4.777 ∗∗∗ 4.740 ∗∗∗ 4.799 ∗∗∗
D8:32−8:34 2.197 ∗∗∗ 2.291 ∗∗∗ 2.308 ∗∗∗ 2.352 ∗∗∗ 2.385 ∗∗∗
D8:34−8:36 0.732 ∗ 0.975 ∗∗ 1.035 ∗∗∗ 1.102 ∗∗∗ 1.146 ∗∗∗
D8:36−8:38 2.159 ∗∗∗ 2.258 ∗∗∗ 2.179 ∗∗∗ 2.244 ∗∗∗ 2.276 ∗∗∗
D8:38−8:40 1.671 ∗∗∗ 1.626 ∗∗∗ 1.663 ∗∗∗ 1.667 ∗∗∗ 1.713 ∗∗∗
D8:40−8:42 1.223 ∗∗∗ 1.185 ∗∗∗ 1.249 ∗∗∗ 1.218 ∗∗∗ 1.257 ∗∗∗
D8:42−8:44 1.141 ∗∗∗ 1.155 ∗∗∗ 1.123 ∗∗∗ 1.137 ∗∗∗ 1.185 ∗∗∗
D8:44−8:50 1.287 ∗∗∗ 1.234 ∗∗∗ 1.248 ∗∗∗ 1.249 ∗∗∗ 1.275 ∗∗∗
D8:50−9:00 0.768 ∗∗∗ 0.820 ∗∗∗ 0.756 ∗∗∗ 0.803 ∗∗∗ 0.836 ∗∗∗
D9:00−9:10 0.441 ∗∗∗ 0.489 ∗∗∗ 0.462 ∗∗∗ 0.492 ∗∗∗ 0.543 ∗∗∗
D9:10−9:20 0.348 ∗∗ 0.386 ∗∗∗ 0.340 ∗∗ 0.381 ∗∗∗ 0.404 ∗∗∗
D9:20−9:30 0.248 0.211 ∗ 0.257 ∗ 0.222 ∗ 0.262 ∗∗
D9:30−9:40 −0.053 −0.010 −0.051 −0.016 −0.013
|S1| 0.165 ∗∗ 0.168 ∗∗∗ 0.228 ∗∗∗
|S2| 0.099 ∗ 0.088 ∗ 0.102 ∗∗
|S3| 0.475 ∗∗∗ 0.287 ∗∗∗ 0.278 ∗∗∗
S1 0.229 ∗∗∗ 0.180 ∗∗∗ 0.219 ∗∗∗
S2 −0.025 −0.008 −0.014







BIC 7.644 6.828 6.799 6.803 6.796 6.800
Fα0=0,α1=1 8.900
∗∗∗ 1.296 1.752 2.305 ∗ 2.633 ∗ 2.052
R2 0.010 0.231 0.349 0.359 0.423 0.425
Maximum Likelihood estimation of 2-minute log returns at employment report
announcement days (sample period: January 1995 to December 1999, i.e. 53 non-
overlapping employment announcement days). For each day the intraday interval
8:22–9:52 ET is analyzed. The Schwartz information criterion (BIC) is given as
well as the Ljung-Box statistic for up to 10 lags of standardized squared residuals
(Qεˆt/σˆ2t (10)). In addition, the R
2 from a regression of observed squared returns on
predicted variances is given along with the results of an F-test on the joint hypothesis
of a zero intercept and a unit slope (Fα0=0,α1=1). Inference is based on robust standard
errors.
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Table 3: Simultaneous estimation of the mean and variance function
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean:
const 0.308 ∗ 0.147 0.174 ∗ 0.194 ∗ 0.199 ∗∗ 0.198 ∗
rt−1 −0.113 ∗∗∗ −0.094 ∗∗∗ −0.099 ∗∗∗ −0.100 ∗∗∗ −0.101 ∗∗∗ −0.100 ∗∗∗
S18:28−8:30 −14.537 ∗∗∗ −3.639 ∗∗ −3.494 ∗∗ −3.152 ∗∗ −3.075 ∗ −2.906 ∗
S18:30−8:32 −34.868 ∗∗∗ −20.351 ∗∗∗ −20.402 ∗∗∗ −20.164 ∗∗∗ −20.158 ∗∗∗ −18.242 ∗∗∗
S18:32−8:34 −9.996 ∗∗∗ −4.640 ∗ −3.853 −3.248 −2.830 −4.134
S28:30−8:32 18.647 ∗∗∗ 21.079 ∗∗∗ 19.555 ∗∗∗ 19.567 ∗∗∗ 19.524 ∗∗∗ 18.677 ∗∗∗
S38:30−8:32 −18.502 ∗∗∗ −25.623 ∗∗∗ −25.327 ∗∗∗ −24.405 ∗∗∗ −24.488 ∗∗∗ −23.300 ∗∗∗
Variance:
const 3.931 ∗∗∗ 3.047 ∗∗∗ 2.507 ∗∗∗ 2.991 ∗∗∗ 2.603 ∗∗∗ 2.549 ∗∗∗
ε2t−1 0.521
∗∗∗ 0.113 ∗∗∗ 0.095 ∗∗∗ 0.080 ∗∗∗ 0.083 ∗∗∗ 0.085 ∗∗∗
ε2t−2 0.039 0.047
∗∗ 0.027 ∗ 0.034 ∗∗ 0.024 ∗ 0.023 ∗
ε2t−3 0.027 0.026
∗ 0.020 0.024 0.019 0.015
D8:26−8:28 0.692 ∗∗ 0.715 ∗∗ 0.632 ∗∗ 0.685 ∗∗ 0.689 ∗∗
D8:28−8:30 2.002 ∗∗∗ 1.998 ∗∗∗ 1.978 ∗∗∗ 1.964 ∗∗∗ 1.948 ∗∗∗
D8:30−8:32 4.162 ∗∗∗ 4.098 ∗∗∗ 4.081 ∗∗∗ 4.074 ∗∗∗ 4.156 ∗∗∗
D8:32−8:34 2.265 ∗∗∗ 2.370 ∗∗∗ 2.401 ∗∗∗ 2.416 ∗∗∗ 2.478 ∗∗∗
D8:34−8:36 1.068 ∗∗∗ 1.267 ∗∗∗ 1.190 ∗∗∗ 1.313 ∗∗∗ 1.363 ∗∗∗
D8:36−8:38 2.268 ∗∗∗ 2.349 ∗∗∗ 2.260 ∗∗∗ 2.328 ∗∗∗ 2.352 ∗∗∗
D8:38−8:40 1.657 ∗∗∗ 1.618 ∗∗∗ 1.648 ∗∗∗ 1.659 ∗∗∗ 1.705 ∗∗∗
D8:40−8:42 1.212 ∗∗∗ 1.192 ∗∗∗ 1.239 ∗∗∗ 1.221 ∗∗∗ 1.258 ∗∗∗
D8:42−8:44 1.123 ∗∗∗ 1.151 ∗∗∗ 1.100 ∗∗∗ 1.131 ∗∗∗ 1.167 ∗∗∗
D8:44−8:50 1.257 ∗∗∗ 1.232 ∗∗∗ 1.230 ∗∗∗ 1.245 ∗∗∗ 1.271 ∗∗∗
D8:50−9:00 0.757 ∗∗∗ 0.821 ∗∗∗ 0.747 ∗∗∗ 0.804 ∗∗∗ 0.834 ∗∗∗
D9:00−9:10 0.418 ∗∗∗ 0.476 ∗∗∗ 0.439 ∗∗∗ 0.477 ∗∗∗ 0.522 ∗∗∗
D9:10−9:20 0.324 ∗ 0.367 ∗∗ 0.314 ∗∗ 0.360 ∗∗ 0.380 ∗∗∗
D9:20−9:30 0.218 0.198 0.231 0.209 ∗ 0.244 ∗
D9:30−9:40 −0.076 −0.019 −0.070 −0.026 −0.024
|S1| 0.169 ∗∗ 0.171 ∗∗∗ 0.232 ∗∗∗
|S2| 0.086 ∗ 0.075 0.093 ∗
|S3| 0.456 ∗∗∗ 0.278 ∗∗∗ 0.266 ∗∗∗
S1 0.223 ∗∗∗ 0.174 ∗∗∗ 0.212 ∗∗∗
S2 −0.023 −0.009 −0.014







BIC 7.233 6.817 6.791 6.795 6.789 6.792
Fα0=0,α1=1 5.115
∗∗∗ 0.659 0.421 0.409 0.253 0.568
R2 0.063 0.219 0.240 0.244 0.249 0.279
Maximum Likelihood estimation of 2-minute log returns at employment report announcement
days. For details see table 2.
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